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What Most Water Technology Companies Get Wrong About Selling to Utilities

Selling technology to municipal water utilities is unlike any other market. What actually works, from someone who's been on both sides of the table.

Adam Tank
Adam Tank
Founder, HydroKnowledge

A few years into building a water technology company, I sat across the table from a procurement director at a mid-sized municipal utility. We had a genuinely good product. The pilot data was strong. The economics were clear. And after eighteen months of conversations, site visits, and proposal revisions, he leaned back in his chair and said: “We love what you’re doing. We’re just not ready to move forward right now.”

Not ready. After eighteen months.

I walked out of that meeting thinking we had failed at sales. What I eventually understood is that we had failed at something earlier: at learning how utilities actually make decisions. The sales process is almost beside the point if you don’t understand the institution you’re selling into.

This is the thing that trips up almost every technology company that enters the water market. They arrive with a commercial sales playbook, a great product, and a genuine belief that the value proposition will carry the day. And then they spend two years wondering why nothing is closing.

The institution shapes everything

Municipal water utilities are not companies. They are public agencies, and that distinction matters in ways that are easy to underestimate.

A utility’s budget is approved by a governing board — often elected or politically appointed officials whose primary accountability is to ratepayers, not to operational efficiency. Capital projects require multi-year planning cycles, environmental review, and frequently, regulatory sign-off. The person you are talking to (the operations manager, the technology director, the engineer) is almost never the final decision-maker. They are a champion, if you are lucky, and a gatekeeper if you are not.

This is not inefficiency for its own sake. Utilities operate infrastructure that cannot fail. The water coming out of the tap has to be safe today, tomorrow, and fifty years from now, regardless of which vendor’s contract is still active. Caution is not a bug in the procurement process; it is a feature built for exactly the right reasons.

Understanding this changes how you should approach the market. Speed is not the metric. Trust is.

Procurement is political, not just procedural

Every utility has a formal procurement process. RFPs, competitive bidding requirements, sole-source justifications, board approvals. You need to understand these; we’ve covered how utilities actually make buying decisions in depth separately. But understanding the process is not the same as understanding how to navigate it.

The real procurement decision happens before the RFP is issued. By the time a utility publishes a formal solicitation, they usually have a strong sense of what they want to buy, and sometimes who they want to buy it from. The RFP is the documentation mechanism for a decision that was already made in hallways, at conferences, and over years of relationship-building.

This means your job is not to win an RFP. Your job is to be the company that shaped what the RFP asks for.

That requires being present long before a formal procurement cycle begins. It means attending AWWA and WaterNow events not as an exhibitor but as a participant: speaking on panels, joining working groups, publishing research that utilities actually read. It means building relationships with utility staff at the working level, not just the executive level, because those are the people who will write the specifications.

It also means understanding the political environment inside the utility. Who is the internal champion for innovation? Who is the skeptic? What has failed before, and why? A utility that got burned by a technology vendor five years ago carries that memory into every conversation with the next vendor. If you do not know that history, you are operating blind.

The pilot is not the shortcut you think it is

Every technology company wants to get to a pilot. The pilot feels like progress — you are in the building, you are generating data, you are proving the product. And pilots are valuable. But they are frequently where deals stall, not where they close.

The reason is structural. A pilot requires a utility to assign staff time, coordinate with operations, and take on some risk. That is a meaningful internal commitment. What it does not do, by itself, is create a path to procurement. Many utilities are very good at running pilots and very slow at converting them to contracts.

Before you agree to a pilot, you need to understand what happens if it succeeds. Who has the authority to move it to a contract? What is the timeline for that decision? What budget exists for it? Is there a capital plan that could fund a full deployment, and when is that plan updated?

If the answers to those questions are vague, you may be about to spend twelve months generating excellent data for a customer who has no mechanism to buy what you are selling.

A pilot should be designed with the end in mind. Define success criteria before you start, agree on what a successful pilot would lead to, and put that understanding in writing. Not as a legal document necessarily, but as a shared understanding that both parties can point to.

Price is not the primary objection

When a utility pushes back on price, it is tempting to respond by lowering the price. Sometimes that is the right move. More often, the price objection is a proxy for something else: uncertainty about fit, concern about implementation complexity, worry about what happens if the vendor doesn’t survive, or simply not having a budget line that the purchase maps to cleanly.

Water utilities are not particularly price-sensitive in the way that commercial enterprises are. If the value is clear and the trust is there, they will find the budget. What they are sensitive to is risk: the risk of choosing the wrong vendor, the risk of a failed implementation, the risk of having to explain a bad decision to a board or to the public.

Your job is to reduce perceived risk at every stage of the conversation. That means being transparent about your company’s financial position and customer base. It means showing other utility references: actual customers who will take a phone call, not marketing case studies. It means being honest about what your product does not do, because utilities have good instincts for overselling and it will cost you trust faster than almost anything else.

What actually works

After years on both sides of this market, as a vendor and as an advisor to utilities and technology companies, the pattern that works looks something like this:

Build presence before you build pipeline. Publish in places utilities read. Speak at events they attend. Be useful in the community before you ask for anything.

Find champions at the working level. The engineer who will use your product every day is more valuable to your sales process than the executive who will sign the contract, because the engineer is the one who will advocate for you internally when you are not in the room.

Run pilots that are designed to lead somewhere. Agree on what success looks like and what happens next before the pilot begins.

Sell the relationship as much as the product. Utilities are making a decision about who they are going to be partnered with for a long time. The product matters, but so does the team, the support model, and the sense that you will still be there five years from now.

Be patient with the timeline and relentless on the relationship. The deals that close in this market almost always look, at some point, like they are going nowhere. The ones that ultimately succeed are usually the ones where the vendor stayed engaged, stayed honest, and kept showing up.

The water market is hard. It is also one of the most mission-critical, resilient, and underserved markets for technology in the world. The companies that figure out how to sell here tend to build something durable. It just rarely happens on the timeline they expected.


Adam Tank is the founder of HydroKnowledge and co-founder of Transcend and Industrial Optic, two VC-backed water technology companies. HydroKnowledge advises water technology companies on go-to-market strategy and municipal sales. Get in touch if you’re working on something in water.

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